Who gave this agent permission?
Knowing which agent is acting does not tell you what it may do. APS gives an agent signed, limited permission, checks it before the action runs, and signs every answer.
One check, two answers
ExampleThe gateway decides before the payment runs, so a refused payment never starts. The $150 goes through only if the other checks pass too, such as the Friday deadline. Both answers are signed, so anyone with the record can check what was decided. A signed "allowed" shows the decision, not that the payment settled.
Passing it on
An agent can hand part of its work to another agent, but it can only hand over less or the same, never more than it holds.
- Youup to $200
- Agent Aup to $200
- Agent Bup to $50valid, it is less
- Agent Bup to $500invalid, A never had $500
If you cancel what you gave Agent A, it can no longer be used, and everything A passed on is cancelled with it.
Three rules
- 1Permission only shrinks
Each handoff can keep a limit or cut it, never raise it. This holds for money, time, what the agent may touch and how many more times it can pass work on.
- 2Checked before it happens
The gateway decides before the action runs. If it cannot confirm the permission, for example because a record is missing, the answer is no.
- 3Every answer is signed
The agent signs what it asked for. The gateway signs what it decided and what it saw happen. Anyone can check those signatures later.
The gateway can only check actions that go through it. If an agent has another way into a system, APS does not see that path.
Use it
Apache 2.0The full rules are in an individual IETF Internet-Draft, which is a published proposal, not an IETF standard. Shared tests live in the Agent Authority Conformance lab. Speed and outside test results are on the benchmarks page.
Technical reference
For implementers, closed by defaultThe seven limits on every permission §4.1
Every permission record carries exactly seven limits. A missing limit makes the record invalid, it never means unlimited. A handoff is valid only when every limit is no wider than its parent's.
- 1Scopewhat the agent may do
Every grant in the child must be covered by a grant in the parent.
- 2Spendper action and cumulative limits, in one unit
Limits can only go down, the unit cannot change, and a bounded parent cannot produce an unbounded child.
- 3Depthhow many more hops it may delegate
Each hop uses up at least one. A parent with none left cannot delegate.
- 4Timethe validity window
The child window must sit inside the parent window.
- 5Reputationthe reputation ceiling
The ceiling cannot rise.
- 6Valuesvalue identifiers the agent must hold to
The child keeps every identifier its ancestors required.
- 7Reversibilityhow irreversible an action may be
The ceiling cannot move toward less reversible.
See an AuthorityDelegationV1 record
{
"record_type": "aps:authority-delegation:v1",
"version": "1.0",
"delegation_id": "sha256:<64-lowercase-hex>",
"parent_delegation_id": null,
"issuer": "did:example:principal",
"subject": "did:example:agent",
"verification_method": "did:example:principal#key-1",
"issued_at": "2026-07-18T22:00:00.000Z",
"nonce": "<32-lowercase-hex>",
"authority": {
"scope": {"profile":"aps-hierarchical-v1",
"grants":["commerce:checkout"]},
"spend": {"mode":"bounded","unit":"iso4217:USD:minor",
"per_action":"5000","cumulative":"10000"},
"depth": {"remaining":2},
"time": {"not_before":"2026-07-18T22:00:00.000Z",
"not_after":"2026-07-19T22:00:00.000Z"},
"reputation": {"profile":"aps-score-0-100-v1","ceiling":80},
"values": {"profile":"aps-values-identifiers-v1",
"required":["F-001","F-003"]},
"reversibility": {"profile":"aps-tci-v1",
"ceiling":"compensable"}
},
"signature": "<128-lowercase-hex>"
}
A full purchase from the draft §9.11.1
A principal gives a procurement agent authority to buy. The procurement agent hands one supplier to a subagent, and each limit in the subagent's copy is the same or narrower.
| Limit | Principal to procurement agent | Procurement agent to subagent |
|---|---|---|
| Scope | checkout | checkout from one supplier's catalogue narrower |
| Spend per action | a set limit | a lower limit narrower |
| Spend cumulative | a set limit | at or below the parent's same or narrower |
| Depth | 2 hops left | 1 hop left narrower |
| Time | until the end of the quarter | inside that window same or narrower |
- IntentThe subagent signs an action intent that names its delegation and commits to the exact purchase.
- DecisionThe boundary checks the chain from root to leaf, issues a permit and reserves the amount against the running total.
- DispatchJust before dispatch the boundary checks time and revocation again and consumes the decision, so it cannot be used twice.
- ResultThe boundary records the result it observed, with a reference to the effect.
The three signed records §5
- signed by the agentAction intent
What the agent wants to do, under which delegation, committed by digest.
- issued by the boundaryPolicy decision
Permit, deny or narrow. A narrow carries the reduced authority and the constraints applied.
- issued by the boundaryAction result
The execution result the boundary observed, when the action was dispatched.
The decision and the dispatch are two steps. A permit is checked again and consumed when it admits the action, so it cannot be replayed or used after its authority has ended. A valid signature or chain is not proof that an outside event happened §2.2, and APS does not establish that no other credential reached the target outside the governed path §2.5.
Six verdicts and eight invariants §2.3 §4.6
A verifier reports one of six verdicts about a permission record, each with a reason code. It describes what the verifier can conclude from what it holds, not what happened in the world.
validthe artifact currently confers the authority claimedinvalidit does not, or no longer does: revoked, expired, exhausted, or under an invalid ancestornot establishedthe verifier cannot reach a conclusion, which is never a finding about the worldnot yet effectivevalidly issued, and an enabling condition has not happened yetsuspendeduse is paused by one or more live causesrestrictedauthority continues in reduced form under a live constraint
Narrowing, spend and signature integrity are enforced when a delegation is issued as well as when it is verified, so an issuer refuses to sign under an expired or revoked parent.
- INV-1Identity verifiability
- INV-2Scope monotonic narrowing
- INV-3Spend limit narrowing
- INV-4Cascade completeness
- INV-5Revocation irreversibility
- INV-6Intent and receipt binding
- INV-7Authority attribution completeness
- INV-8Signature integrity
Wire formats
| Record | What it is | Draft |
|---|---|---|
Agent passport | The agent's own signed identity. It does not name who the agent acts for. | §3.1 |
PrincipalBindingV1 | A separate record, signed by the principal, that ties an agent to the person or organization it acts for. | §3.3 |
AuthorityDelegationV1 | The signed authority record with its seven facets. | §4.1 |
Revocation record | Ends a delegation, and through it everything issued under it. | §4.5.2 |
action_ref | A digest that commits to the exact action input. | §5.1 |
ReceiptV1 | The envelope for action intent, policy decision and action result records. | §7.1 |
DecisionRefV1 | Commits a policy decision to the action, the authority state, the policy input and the output by digest, without embedding them. | §7.4 |
Records are canonical JSON signed with Ed25519.
The older Delegation API
The SDKs still ship an older Delegation record for compatibility, and it is not the same as AuthorityDelegationV1. An erratum of 2026-08-17 noted that the verifiers compared spend and depth only when both parent and child carried the field. AuthorityDelegationV1 closes that gap because all seven limits are required and every one is compared, including containment of the validity window. The older Delegation API still compares an optional field only when it is present, so new integrations should use AuthorityDelegationV1. The authority documentation describes both.
Extensions outside the draft
- Commerce preflight
Payment checks for passport, scope, spend limit, merchant allowlist and idempotency, with a human approval threshold.
- Reputation
Scoring that a deployment can use for the reputation limit.
- Beneficiary attribution
Crediting work back to the person or organization an agent acts for. This is companion work, and its API has moved to the gateway package.
- OAuth ID-JAG
The TypeScript SDK can take an already verified ID-JAG grant as the root of an APS delegation. It is pinned to ID-JAG draft -04 and does not verify the grant itself.
Cross-engine receipt interop has been demonstrated with VeritasActa and protect-mcp. Known limits are in the threat model.
Read further
- draft-pidlisnyi-aps-04, the individual Internet-Draft
- Developer documentation · Verify a receipt in your browser · Research
- For AI agents: llms-full.txt · MCP descriptor